Introduction

So in the Libyan fable it is told, that Once an Eagle stricken with a dart, said when he saw the fashion of the shaft, "with our own feathers, not by others hands, are we now smitten." -Aeschlyus
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) sits quietly before the United States Senate awaiting its opportunity for ratification so that the United States may become the 11 th nation of forty-four required for its global entry into force. Never has a nation worked so hard for, in theory, and so diligently against, in practice, an international treaty. Thirty-six years ago, and just five months before his assassination, President
Kennedy became the first American president to call for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing 1 . In the days of the cold war a comprehensive test ban seemed the world's only hope to step back from continued proliferation and nuclear holocaust. Still, as the dangers of nuclear war became more pronounced, the arms race continued its feverish pace unabated, as if somehow immune from the impending disaster. Nuclear deterrence became both an art form and insurance policy. Sophisticated weapons promising greater and more accurate destruction rolled off the superpower shelves. The difficulty of achieving consensus for such a broad and enduring purpose as a comprehensive test ban was difficult at best. Other treaties with similar goals lay languishing under the heat of discriminated opposition. Both advocates and opponents have written so much about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) it is difficult to discern what the real effect of the treaty would be on non-proliferation and American security. Most discussions on the CTBT involve global security, but to the extent the United States must ratify and comply in order for the global effect to occur, it is important to examine what the sacrifices and benefits are to American national security first. The CTBT is not a panacea for global security, nor does it spell certain disaster for the safety of American nuclear weapons.
Interestingly, the treaty bans "nuclear testing" without defining the term. 2 This paper will present the main arguments in support of and in opposition to the CTBT as they effect nuclear non-proliferation and American security. Discussion of the recent nuclear testing by India and Pakistan is offered as a case study on proliferation and the possible effect of the CTBT, before concluding with the author's belief on the real impact of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to nuclear non-proliferation and American security. This paper will not discuss the technical aspects of nuclear weapons as they are inferred in the CTBT. The broadly accepted definitions of vertical proliferation being indicative of the growth and increased sophistication of the nuclear weapon states arsenals, and horizontal proliferation referring to the acquisition of any type of nuclear weapon by nonnuclear nations, will be used. linkage is spelled out in the pre-amble of the NPT which recalls "The determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water…to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all times and to continue negotiations to this end." 5 In a very real sense the CTBT is an extension of and integral to the NPT. As Mr.
Richard Garwin, noted arms control commentator, explain, "There seems no way in which one of the nuclear weapon states could continue to test without provoking the others to do the same, and thereby imperil the NPT regime." 6 Since the CTBT contains no additional provisions for those nations already committed to the NPT; there is broad consensus among non-nuclear NPT signatory nations for passage of the CTBT to constrain the nuclear weapon states. 7 It was no surprise to any of the proponents of the CTBT that President Clinton, upon submitting the treaty to the Senate for ratification called it "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control." 8 The
United States had no choice but to commit to a comprehensive test ban if it was to get an extension to and possible permanence for the NPT. 9 The need for a CTBT, many proponents argue, has never been greater. Historical progress and the treaty's relationship to the NPT gives momentum to advocates of the CTBT. Idealists counter concerns of testing, verification and modernization with their own scientific evidence and belief.
Effect on Non-Proliferation and Verification
The CTBT effect on non-proliferation will be dramatic proponents argue, primarily because as sophisticated as simulation may be, testing will always be required to ensure the reliability and safety of a new design. can be disregarded because of their depth and similarity to other events known to be nonnuclear, but many will not be identified so easily." 14 The fall back for this system is onsite investigation and national intelligence systems that will help complete the verification picture. The bottomline is that advocates of the new system believe treaty verification is achievable under the CTBT.
Maintenance and Modernization under the CTBT
Proponents of the CTBT believe it will not affect the maintenance and modernization be constructed facilities to demonstrate the enhanced predictive capability necessary to support a stockpile stewardship program without testing". 16 Proponents of the CTBT including the President of the United States are convinced that maintenance and modernization of the nuclear deterrent can be achieved under the auspices of the treaty.
American Leadership in the Next Millennium
Perhaps the most compelling argument for supporters of the CTBT is the impact to American leadership in the next millennium if the CTBT is not ratified and the NPT regime falls, as many believe it will. While it is hard to quantify such an impact most diplomats believe as Dr. Kenny does that, "Ratification is critical to the US efforts to maintain an effective role in maintaining and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is the principal constraint on testing by non-nuclear weapon states…the urgency for the US action derives not only because our leadership role will probably stimulate a wave of ratification's, including Russia and China, but also because it will
give the United States a seat at a special conference that can be called after September This chapter will examine the case against the CTBT including the following: The treaty's relationship to the NPT, the effect on horizontal proliferation, the difficulty of its entry into force, the effect of no testing on the safety of nuclear stockpile, the difficulty of treaty verification, the problem of fusion weapons, and finally the impact to nuclear deterrence and American leadership.
The Failing of the NPT
The case against the CTBT is based in part on the weaknesses of the treaty itself; it does not save the failing NPT regime. Elimination of testing is not a step towards nuclear disarmament (in support of the NPT) as many believe. Scholars like Dr. Kathleen C.
Bailey argue that for the foreseeable future nuclear deterrence will remain the backbone of national defense and lack of testing will not change that paradigm; it will just increase the danger associated with it: "NPT parties are discovering that the CTBT does not constitute a step towards disarmament as they thought it was. This is because the nuclear weapon states are by no means abandoning nuclear deterrence but are instead taking steps to assure their stockpiles will remain safe and reliable and, therefore, usable despite the testing ban."
2 Dr Victor W Sidel, a member of the Conference on Disarmament and long time supporter of a comprehensive test ban, reluctantly agrees: "Without a real move by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) towards the abolition of nuclear weapons, the CTBT in its current form permits continued "vertical" proliferation by the NWS, helps maintain the NWS monopoly, is provocative to the nuclear have nots, and may actually intensify the nuclear arms race." 3 The linkage between the NPT and the CTBT that advocates of the treaty argue is so critical does not pass the common sense test as Dr Bailey explains:
"It is the dependence of the Nuclear Weapon States on deterrence despite the NPT commitment to disarmament, that is the greatest source of danger to the non-proliferation treaty, and this conflict will persist regardless of whether the CTBT is ratified by the United States or not" 4 It is difficult to imagine, as opponents of the treaty point out, a world with no need for nuclear deterrence, given the posturing of many NWS including China and Russia. If the CTBT fails to create a meaningful link towards disarmament, that will be the least of its problems, according to realists.
The Effect on Horizontal Proliferation
While advocates of the CTBT take pride in the inherent beneficial effect on vertical proliferation, which realists may even grant them, the real problem in today's post cold war is not vertical proliferation, but horizontal. The CTBT does little or nothing to help prevent the creation of a relatively simple nuclear device by a rogue nation or its enemy.
In fact the high-tech accuracy and sophistication of the nuclear weapons states arsenals is not likely to be repeated by emerging nations who see the multiple capability as well beyond their needs. Realists are quick to remind the nation that as Dr Garwin writes, the CTBT is no panacea for nuclear disarmament: "A CTB Treaty is only that-a ban on nuclear explosions of any yield exceeding zero; it is not a treaty by which nuclear weapon states agree to give up their nuclear weapons, reduce their numbers or even stop their development." 7 Critics conclude that horizontal proliferation of crude first generation weapons is possible under the CTBT.
The Ratification Debacle and Requirement of Testing to Ensure Safety
The CTBT was opened for signature on 24 September 1996. To date 151 nations have signed the treaty but only 24 have ratified it. 8 More importantly, the treaty will enter into force only after the 44 nuclear capable states including India and Pakistan ratify it. 9 Currently, only ten nations of the 44 required have ratified the treaty, which must be entered into force by September 1999. 10 As will be discussed in the next chapter, the likelihood of India and Pakistan signing and ratifying the treaty in its current form are by all accounts, slim. As Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott argues, the CTBT's ratification debacle makes it even less palatable: "The nuclear spiral in South Asia demonstrates the irrelevance of U.S action on the [CTBT] . The CTBT will not enter into force unless 44 countries-including India and Pakistan-ratify it. That is not likely. Instead, it now appears likely that the administration's push for the CTBT actually accelerated the greatest proliferation disaster in decades: two new nuclear powers emerging in the last few weeks." 11 In short, opponents of the treaty argue that American ratification will have little effect on the treaty's ability to enter into force; that little effect weighed against the other disadvantages makes this treaty not worth the price.
As much as most conservative opponents love the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program, the restrictions on testing the CTBT requires will effect the ability to modernize American weapons against emerging threats. The SSMP entails some risk as Dr Ferderber explains: "The risk in replacing nuclear testing with a science-based predictive capability lie not only in the risk that the science program will not be able to develop reliable predictive tools, but also in the risk that we may become overconfident about our predictive ability. High confidence can be misplaced, especially in complex systems." 12 Even if the SSMP gives the predictive ability to maintain the stockpiles reliability many argue that will not guarantee an effective nuclear deterrent. As Dr. 
The Fusion Loophole and the Effect on Nuclear Deterrence
While most critics of the CTBT admit some general benefit to proliferation if the treaty could be entered into force, ardent realists point to perhaps the most important form of new vertical proliferation, fusion weapons, and highlight that the CTBT does not restrict their development. Fusion weapons are not for the light of heart. There is little chance most experts concede, of non-nuclear or nuclear threshold states going beyond the theory stage of these weapons, but with programs like the SSMP, fusion weapons could become a reality for those nations who pursue them. The National Ignition Facility to built under the auspices of the SSMP is for small laboratory controlled fusion experiments, which the United States maintains is not covered under the test ban. 20 The problem of course is that the United States is not the only nation that can afford such development. If fusion weapons prove feasible, one report argues, "they could proliferate. Such weapons would be tempting to nations, because they could be very small or very large and relatively more lethal than existing thermo-nuclear weapons which must be triggered by a fission explosion." 21 So even though the United States plans to exploit the fusion loophole through the SSMP the relative level of vertical proliferation through fusion weapons remains unchanged by the CTBT.
The cumulative effect of the CTBT would weaken our nuclear deterrent. The United
States has the most to lose since historically other nations have not honored previous testing moratoriums. Many hard line critics charge that the perception of declining confidence and reliability in our nuclear stockpile might lead other nations like Germany and Japan who rely on the American nuclear umbrella to re-visit their decision to stay non-nuclear. 22 Some nuclear abolitionists believe that this CTBT is actually a step backwards as Dr. Sidel argues: "The NWS have refused for three decades to set up any timetable for compliance with Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which calls for nuclear as well as general disarmament. Even after the world court in a unanimous advisory opinion in 1997 called on the NWS to move expeditiously toward fulfillment of their obligations under Article 6, the NWS have refused to make a timebound commitment. I have come to agree with India's long held position that a CTBT without a timebound framework for abolition may be a step backward." 23 The polarization of scientist's and academia on the CTBT is astounding, but on this issue at least both hard line realists and nuclear abolitionist's agree for different reasons that the current CTBT will be a step backwards. The realist version of American leadership believes that it is simply too soon to commit to a timebound nuclear disarmament and that any suggestion that America is ready for that is misleading and dangerous. Better for friend and foe alike to understand American commitment to the nuclear deterrent, than for a costly misjudgment to occur which would test American resolve and capability.
The loss of prestige associated with not ratifying the CTBT is not something leaders like India has sought to maintain its "nuclear option" 2 . While critics like Mr. Kimball argue a nefarious motive for the testing, Indian scholars have articulated a contrarian paradigm, which rejects the view that the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia is destabilizing.
As former Indian Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Krishnaswami Sundarji explains, "A minimum nuclear deterrent will act as stabilizing factor. Pakistan will see it as counteracting India's superior conventional power potential and providing a more level playing field, making the chance of conventional war between the two countries less than before. As Kenneth N. Waltz puts it, 'conventional wars fought by countries that do not have nuclear weapons are likelier than conventional or nuclear wars fought by countries that have nuclear weapons.' " 3 Because India's nuclearization is based on minimum deterrence there is no need for an arms race just the "assured capability of a second strike that can inflict unacceptable damage." 4 This contrarian view that the spread of nuclear weapons can increase stability, rather than threaten international peace, put forward by Kenneth N. Waltz, as stable nuclear deterrence, flies in the face of CTBT advocates, who believe that nuclear weapons are inherently de-stabilizing. 5 The consensus of academia in the region seem to believe that Gen. Sundaraji is correct, as Assad Durrani, director of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence writes: "There were a number of crises that could have resulted in armed conflict between the two countries, but the specter of nuclearization checked the hostilities in their tracks." 6 What are the implications for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? India's position appears to be pragmatic, with a 91% approval rating for the testing from its citizens, the government appears ready to enter negotiations now that the tests are complete.
7
The completion of Indian nuclear testing on May 13 th was seen as a failure of
American influence in the non-proliferation regime. As described previously, the yields for the 13 May tests were below the detectable threshold level for a complete CTBT monitoring system (IMS). In fact the closest monitoring station to the tests, in Nilore, Pakistan about 700kms away picked up nothing. 8 Proponents rightly point out that the station in Nilore is not broad array sensor as envisioned by the IMS but a "stand-in" one, while conceding that the tests were below the planned verification range of 1 Kiloton. 
Notes
The CTBT's impact on Non-Proliferation, and American Security A careful cost/benefit analysis of the CTBT reveals that the Administration has made its case for the ratification. The linkage to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is universally perceived despite the very real reliance on nuclear deterrence that opponents point out.
The problems with horizontal proliferation of first generation weapons that might occur under the CTBT are not unique to its ratification since the countries most likely to proliferate, like Iran and North Korea, will not be signatories, nor will they be after the type of weapons that testing is required for. In fact, ratification could decrease some horizontal proliferation and by no accounts would increase it, so some relative advantage is left to proponents of the treaty. Vertical proliferation may still occur under the less than stringent interpretation of the treaty the United States has indicated it will use. The treaty does make it less likely that the Nuclear Weapon States will deploy entirely new weapons but allows them to modernize non-nuclear components of current weapons, In short, while each of the arguments against the CTBT has some merit the astute negotiation of this treaty has minimized their cumulative effect. The treaty continues the world on the path towards nuclear disarmament without significantly altering American capability.
The real contribution of ratifying the CTBT to American security is continued American leadership in the next millennium. With so many nations looking for the United States to lead the world into a nuclear free future, it would be difficult if not impossible, to abdicate the American position on this treaty and expect to lead on other vital issues where our nations security may be at stake. Realists have found a way to, if not to satisfy their concern, at least satiate it, through the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP). Hundreds of billions of dollars in programs to enhance and maintain our current nuclear stockpile, which even the most ardent hawk would admit, is more than ample for the threats, America faces. The SSMP has been criticized as a concession to the hard liners, but as one Clinton official anonymously points out, it serves it purpose even to idealists, "This program isn't about safety and reliability, we know that. But most people here [in the administration] view it as the cost of the test ban.
In order to get the treaty through congress we had to buy off the labs, we had to bribe them. It may be a Faustian bargain, but the dominant view here is it was politically necessary." 1 What the United States has done is negotiate a CTBT that has a minimal effect on its nuclear deterrent while still leading the rest of the world towards the long term Article VI NPT goal of total nuclear disarmament. The SSMP was a master stroke for the conservative realists and weapons laboratories; billions of dollars in material and equipment in exchange for supporting a treaty that may never enter into force, against a backdrop of political pressure that may have prevented testing even without the CTBT.
The agreement of the President to affirm the safety and reliability of American nuclear weapons as a supreme national interest under the treaty was another key event. 
